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venerdì 12 aprile 2013

Il falso mito della Lady di Ferro


Molti dei pezzi scritti dopo la morte di Margaret Thatcher si concentrano sulla sua personalità politica, ammirata da alcuni, detestata da altri. A sinistra si parla di metodi sbagliati, di furia contro le classi lavoratrici, a destra si parla di innovatrice e modernizzatrice. Poco si dice sulla sua eredità economica, e quel poco che viene scritto è di solito un elogio senza critica. Tanti difetti ma la Gran Bretagna è tornata grande grazie a lei. Gli articoli che proponiamo qui sotto raccontano una storia assai diversa. Per Oliver Huitson il successo economico della Thatcher è stato, in realtà, un disastro. La Lady di Ferro sfruttò il petrolio del Mar del Nord per succhiare soldi e rimettere in sesto la bilancia dei pagamenti, un fattore totalmente estemporaneo che fortemente contribuì alla sua politica economica. Per il resto privatizzò brutalmente, favorendo la City e facendo pagare, per decenni, il prezzo di queste privatizzazioni al pubblico britannico - servizi pubblici venduti a basso prezzo e poi "affittati" dai nuovi padroni ai cittadini a caro prezzo. La vendita delle case popolari formò una solida base di consenso anche tra i più poveri ma creò le condizioni per la crisi degli alloggi odierna, e le conseguenti nuove forme di povertà.
Più in generale, l'economia della Thatcher - e dei governi che le sono succeduti - si è basata su un aumento della spesa generato dalla finanziarizzazione dell'economia - a cominciare dai prestiti fatti contro il valore della casa - e non certo da un cambiamento drastico nella struttura economica. La formula è di spremere tutte le risorse disponibili, passate, presenti e, soprattutto, future, senza nessuna attenzione per la sostenibilità del modello economico.
Martin Wolf, del Financial Times, riconosce alcuni meriti a Lady Thatcher, ma arriva a conclusioni non molto diverse. L'economia britannica è una economia debole, basata sulla City e su un mercato del lavoro senza regole, ma è povera di prospettive. Gli investimenti, pubblici e privati, sono deboli e la governance economica è legata soprattutto al mondo della finanza, incapace di vedere a le prospettive economiche che vanno oltre ai 2-3 mesi. La mancanza di uno stato solido, di istituzioni capaci, l'affidarsi acriticamente al mercato, hanno riportato la Gran Bretagna indietro al 19 secolo, invece di farla entrare nel 21. Un paradosso che sarebbe il caso che anche i politici di casa nostra, tecnici o meno, tenessero presente.



Thatcher - black gold or red bricks?   


di Oliver Huitson
da OpenDemocracy

Beneath the ‘sycophancy/street party’ binary of reaction to Thatcher’s death are questions of alternatives and efficacy. When the MP of Finchley took power in ’79, with Britain in a dire economic situation, was there really “no alternative”? The question presupposes that Thatcher’s slash ‘n burn monetarism at least worked.
As the badge pictured above states, “If Maggie is the answer it must be a very silly question!” – which it was. Francis Wheen’s Strange Days Indeed portrays the sheer ridiculousness of the late 70s with considerable wit and atmospheric detail. But Thatcher’s ‘success’ often hides just how silly an answer it really was.
Despite sending unemployment ballooning to 3m and decimating whole communities Thatcher did, from a certain perspective, eventually pull the economy back around even if never matching the achievements of the post-war model in terms of growth. Overseeing two recessions, average growth under Thatcher was around 2%. Yet the means by which she managed those apparently successful economic achievements require some examination. As Anthony Barnett argues, North Sea oil was critical:
“[It] came on stream bringing in an estimated £70 billion in revenues, it turned the UK into an OPEC country, an oil-exporter, and it overturned a chronic balance of payments problem rooted in the post-war period of clinging to imperial over-stretch.”
What happened to the proceeds from this unexpected and unearned windfall? Easy come, easy go – it was spent. Contrast this to both the Gulf states and the Nordic countries, who invested the proceeds of their natural resources to provide ongoing national income, and one of the defining features of Thatcherism is revealed. On top of the oil revenue binge, many vast state-owned industries were also sold off at knock-down prices. Highlighting her economic extremism, these included natural monopolies like gas, water and electricity; the toll booth economy - which would reach its zenith with Major's privatisation of the trains - was core Thatcherism. As Tom Mills notes, “These privatisations proved to be hugely profitable for the City of London and represented a massive transfer of wealth from public to private hands”. This wasn’t so much flogging the family silver as flogging the family home and renting it back – a process continued under Blair. Under the sweeping liberalisation she instigated, Britain now owns very little and we instead pay firms – often based overseas – for the privilege of using our own airports and water supplies, to name but two examples.
Another of Thatcher’s magic potions was 'home equity withdrawal' or remortgaging - drawing down the equity in the borrowers home for (mainly) consumption purposes – new cars, holidays, and so forth. Under the two Prime Ministers that preceded her, James Callaghan and Ted Heath, home equity withdrawal as a percentage of GDP growth was around 36% for both. Under Thatcher, this exploded to over £250bn across her premiership – a staggering 104% of GDP growth. To a significant extent, Thatcher grew the economy by unleashing easy credit, asset inflation (including house prices) and equity draw downs – ‘wealth creation’ indeed.
As an economic programme this is evidently unsustainable – oil runs out, assets run out (add the NHS to the list) and relying on rising house prices is, as the world has so painfully learnt, not exactly a model of financial prudence. The critical point is that without these asset sales and home equity it is questionable whether the economy would have been growing at all.
The story of Blair's New Labour is eerily familiar. Under Major, such withdrawals amounted to only 8% of GDP growth, perhaps reflecting the wider economic climate. But Blair did his homework and let loose – as did Thatcher – a wave of cheap credit, financial deregulation, house price inflation and an equity withdrawal-led consumption boom. Withdrawals under Blair’s leadership totalled around £365bn, that’s a full 103% of GDP growth over the same period. “We have abolished boom and bust” became the Global Financial Crisis.
Thatcherism is the ultimate in live now, pay later. Or rather, let others pay later. Conservative thought is inescapably rooted in time, both forward and backward facing, yet Thatcherism – like much neoclassical economics – is largely void of any temporal narrative; all must be consumed. And consumed now. The relationship between ‘those who are living, those who are dead and those who are to be born’ becomes not one of continuity but of expropriation, the efforts of both past and future are sucked into the current moment and devoured in a gross concertina. 
Her destruction of industry, too, bore the same marks of time compression. Like the textbook models of her intellectual acolytes, displaced workers would effortlessly reskill and slide into more productive and competitive industries: like financial services. Thirty years later, many of those decaying communities are still waiting. Indeed, many of them will be precisely those targeted by Cameron’s welfare purge. Thatcher may be gone but her work continues.
My first memory, incidentally, of anything concerning politics was Thatcher, or rather the effect she had on my otherwise very mild-mannered father. In the late 80s, aged around 5, I was baffled that this woman could generate such visceral loathing. Growing up, I absorbed the highly nuanced understanding that Labour – good, Tories – bad, but this made it all the more disorientating to hear at the kitchen table some years later that “Labour are just the same as the Tories now”. Tony Blair, Thatcher’s “greatest achievement” in her view, had arrived.
Ten years later, in the City, I worked for a long time under a lively (and vocal) working-class Thatcherite, quite a significant demographic in Thatcher’s reign that some find hard to reconcile. He combined a playful, ‘loadsamoney’ vulgarity and Gordon Gecko fantasies with a strident, Gareth Keenan’esque militarism – all of which he found well accommodated in Thatcherism (the Falklands war satisfying the latter). After we’d got the pleasantries out the way (“fucking militant lefty”, “soppy liberal bastard” or combinations thereof) what always marked the end of hostilities was a heart to heart moment, his chair pulled close to mine, sotto voce:
“No no, seriously, I’ll be straight with you, the reason my parents loved Thatcher, what meant more than anything to them - she let them buy their own house”
The ‘right to buy’ policy allowed many to buy their own home at a greatly reduced priced, something they would never have been able to do otherwise, and – all else being equal – that was clearly a positive step. But like so many of her policies, this was ultimately a combination of something for nothing (the gap between purchase price and market value) and the appropriation of past and future resources – the social housing built up by former generations was rapidly sold off and wasn’t replaced, a significant factor in today’s chronic housing shortage. As the Independent writes,
“More than 1.25 million tenants took advantage of the “Right to Buy” scheme, which raised £18bn and converted thousands of Labour voters into Conservatives – though as council-housing stock shrank, homeless beggars appeared on the streets for the first time in 30 years.
How different today’s youth might find their housing predicament if the proceeds of right-to-buy had been ring-fenced and put towards further social housing. But the moment must consume all, posterity be damned.
Post-war, the ‘golden age’ – which in many respects it was – ended long before Thatcher came to power. As Jamie Mackay notes,
“The post-war 'consensus' version of nationalisation had essentially replicated old forms of power.”
On the issue of both economic ownership and control, the divisions persisted and escalated, exacerbated by the monetary devastation of the oil shocks in ’73 and ‘79. This line of thought was echoed by Ken Loach when I interviewed him earlier this year about his new film, The Spirit of ’45. An impressive and moving film, I still left the screening wondering whether it would have had greater impact had he really engaged with the Thatcher issue – she didn’t only win, she won three times. She answered something.
But her answer, like Blair’s, contains a disturbing truth - Britain seems no longer able to generate sound productive growth and prefers the toxic mix of financial alchemy, asset sales to finance a balance of payments deficit, and house price inflation and draw-downs to maintain domestic demand. As Elliott and Atkinson argue in their new book, Going South, Britain’s problems are deep-rooted and quite fundamental: we are in real danger of “de-developing”. Their comparison of the UK with developing countries chimes with elements of Will Davies’ recent article, ‘Britain’s Brehznev-style capitalism’,
British capitalism already has many of the hallmarks of Brezhnev-era socialist decline: macroeconomic stagnation, a population as much too bored as scared to protest about very much, a state that performs tongue-in-cheek legitimacy, politicians playing with statistics to try and delay the moment of economic reckoning.”
If Thatcherism was the answer, it could plainly never remain the answer for very long – it is unsustainable even by its own internal logic, such as it is. Making things for a world market is competitive, it’s hard, it needs sound infrastructure, solid education and joined up government. So much easier to simply flog the assets built up by previous generations and bestowed by geography, and load the next generations with debt (Thatcher ran deficits in all but two of her 11 years). What is this if not a “something for nothing” culture?
Managing the demands of ownership, participation, reciprocity, equity and productivity still seems as far as off today as it did in ’79. The question of what Thatcher really achieved, and what she left behind, needs to be answered afresh by her supporters post-08. She did not save Britain from economic decline but merely postponed it, and gorged on the assets of both past and future in the process. Thatcherism was a remarkably irresponsible, economically stagnant and anti-social creed; we are still reeling from the consequences.

fonte: http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/oliver-huitson/thatcher-black-gold-or-red-bricks


Britain should not go back to the future

The UK has been left an economy with a remarkably late-19th century look
Today’s British economy is the legacy of Margaret Thatcher. The governments that succeeded her did not change the broad lines of her policies. John Major privatised the railways. Labour lightly regulated the City of London and made the Bank of England independent. When it did reverse direction – such as with the introduction of the minimum wage – the measures were carefully calibrated. So how should we judge Thatcher’s legacy?
The UK economy has registered at least four clear successes since 1979, notes Professor John Van Reenen of the London School of Economics.
First, roughly a century of underperformance relative to its peers came to an end. In 1979, according to the Conference Board’s database, UK gross domestic product per head (at purchasing power parity) was 76 per cent of US levels, while French GDP per head was 82 per cent. By 2007, UK GDP per head was up to 83 per cent of US levels, while the French level was down to 73 per cent. By 2007, UK GDP per head was third highest in the Group of Seven leading economies, after the US and Canada.
Second, this marked turnround was because of a relative improvement in both employment and productivity. In 1979, output per worker in the UK was 75 per cent of US levels, far behind that in France, at 88 per cent. By 2007, UK output per worker was 85 per cent of US levels, the same as in France.
Third, the improvement in productivity performance was not just the result of a financial bubble: only 10 per cent of the productivity growth between 1979 and 2007 was generated inside finance.
Finally, the collapse in economy-wide productivity performance since 2007 is a mirror image of the greater flexibility of real wages and consequent employment resilience. Moreover, the poor productivity performance since 2007 has not eroded all the prior gains.
The evidence, then, is that the market-oriented and regulatory reforms – labour market liberalisation, withdrawal of subsidies and privatisation – did improve UK performance. But Prof Van Reenen also notes important failures: rising inequality, excessive financial deregulation and inadequate investment in both human and physical capital.
I agree. But I would put these criticisms in a wider context, one that bears on where the post-crisis UK might now go. Thatcher – like many who supported her – had a 19th-century view of the economy, rejecting most of what happened in the 20th century. She was a pragmatic politician: she did not seek to abolish the welfare state. The same was true of US President Ronald Reagan. But her core belief was that all good things would follow from pruning back the state.
The economic history of the UK suggests this view is, at the least, incomplete. The nation did not fall behind the late-19th century US or Germany because its governments did too much. It was far more because it was culturally and institutionally incapable of remaining central during the “second industrial revolution” – an era of rapid innovations and giant corporations. Increasingly, the British became rentiers. That was one reason why the City became the leading global financial centre.
It is not an accident that an effort by a forceful politician to reverse the interventionism of the 20th century has brought the UK so far back to this future. Thus, it has a huge financial centre, weak domestic manufacturing, a deregulated labour market, rising inequality and low private and public investment. It all looks remarkably late-19th century.
As Richard Lambert, former director-general of the CBI, the business organisation, and former FT editor, noted in a recent lecture, the British business sector still shows a “relatively low commitment to long-term investment, [and] to research and innovation”. When the City determines how companies are run, that is sure to happen. A company such as Rolls-Royce could hardly be created today. That is not what the City would dare to support.
So how should the UK build on Thatcher’s legacy? As Andy Haldane, a leading BoE official, notes, radical simplification could still make the economy work far better in some areas – taxes and the reform of financial regulation, for example. In other respects, however, the government has to act much more positively. It needs, for example, to consider its balance sheet, not just its debts. It must see the case for far higher investment when interest rates are so low. It must appreciate more the role it has to play in promoting science-led innovation.
The crisis has shown that the post-Thatcher economy was weaker than many believed. Going back to the 19th century is also not enough. The country needs institutions, public and private, better capable of generating widely shared growth. Is that possible? Perhaps not. But it is today’s challenge. 

giovedì 21 marzo 2013

Cipro, tra Russia ed Europa


Riportiamo qualche altro commento dalla stampa internazionale sulla crisi di Cipro. Il Parlamento di Nicosia ha rifiutato il bail out europeo e Bruxelles e Berlino ora chiedono un altro piano. Il convitato di pietra, in questo caso, è la Russia che ha interessi importati nell'isola mediterranea, dove gli oligarchi ammassano le loro fortune per poi farle rientrare in patria a tassazione agevolata.
Il problema, però, non è solo di Cipro. L'Islanda, tanto per dire, era in una situazione molto simile, con un sistema bancario gonfiato dalla valuta estera - nel caso di Cipro le passività del sistema finanziario sono 8 volte il PIL, ed in Islanda erano 10 volte il valore dell'economia. Ma anche stati più grandi, come l'Irlanda (4 volte superiore) e la Gran Bretagna (4.5) si trovano in situazioni simili. Tutti e quattro i paesi sono incorsi in gravi crisi bancarie, con gli ultimi due per il momento salvati dai propri cittadini a costi elevati, mentre l'Islanda ha fatto pagare il costo della crisi ai creditori. Il piano UE era di dividere le perdite su entrambi i fronti (prelievo sui depositi di tutte le dimensioni e senza discriminazione esteri-domestici, cosa per altro proibita dall'Europa) ma il Parlamento cipriota, appunto, ha detto no. Trovare i soldi nella sola economia cipriota, troppo piccola, pare improbabile, a meno che non si trovi un accordo con i russi sul gas del Mediterraneo. La soluzione più equa e convincente pare in ogni caso far pagare il conto ai creditori più ricchi, cioè una tassa solo sui depositi maggiori. E chiedere nel caso alla Russia di compensare per le perdite dei propri cittadini - come in effetti avrebbe dovuto fare la Grecia, tanto per dire, invece di accettare il piano d'austerity.
Non è una soluzione facile, ne và dello status di Cipro e del suo intero sistema bancario - come spiega bene nell'articolo qui sotto Jeremy Warner - ma di mezzo ci sono anche gli interessi strategici della Germania e i suoi rapporti con la Russia (non è una sorpresa che sian stati proprio Merkel e Schauble ad insistere per un bail out salva russi, pur senza spese addizionali per i tedeschi). In generale, però, come fa notare Paul Krugman nell'articolo successivo, quello di Cipro è un problema del capitalismo finanziario tutto, dove i movimenti di capitale destabilizzano il sistema e creano paradisi off-shore per chiunque ne abbia la possibilità. Anche rimettere in ordine Cipro non servirebbe. In fondo, i capitali russi fuoriusciti da Nicosia potrebbero pur sempre trovare ottimo alloggio a Londra. Ed il discorso non finisce qui. Come avevamo spiegato tempo fa, e come spiegato anche nell'ultimo articolo presentato, di Martin Wolf, in discussione è il rapporto tra banche e governo. E' giusto che i governi garantiscano i depositi, sballando dunque il sistema di incentivi della banche stesse, che possono dunque continuare a comportarsi irresponsabilmente? Il problema è globale e necessita una risposta globale.

Cyprus should do what Iceland did, and just confiscate the Russian money   



da Telegraph

It's a funny thing about small islands on the fringes of Europe – or in the case of the UK, not so small – but they do seem particularly prone to banking crises, as the latest shenanigans in Cyprus has once again proved. "Maybe it is something in the surrounding waters, but banks in such places evidently should come with a “caveat insula investor” (Let the island investor beware) sign in the window!" muses Jacob Funk Kirkegaard in this penetrating piece for Washington's Peterson Institute.
Whatever. One thing they do have in common is that they all allowed their banking sectors to grow to sizes where they were essentially too big to save – or almost too big to save in the case of the UK. Pre-crisis, Iceland's banking liabilities amounted to around 10 times its annual GDP, with Ireland it was four times, and with Cyprus it is eight times. Britain was at least 4.5 times.
Britain has gone its own route in dealing with the fall-out from a banking sector which massively outgrew the economy. But for smaller islands where the same phenomenon has occurred, two very different approaches have emerged. The choice, as Mr Kirkegaard puts it, is between an "Icelandic bail-in" and an "Irish bailout".
In Iceland, the government allowed the banks to go bust but protected domestic retail and wholesale depositors. The losses were instead born by other creditors, including bondholders and foreign depositors in the UK and the Netherlands. Iceland subsequently agreed partially to pay the British and Dutch deposits back over time.
In Ireland, by contrast, they saved the banks with a blanket guarantee of all creditors. This proved unmanageable and eventually forced the Irish government into insolvency alongside the banks. Irish taxpayers are still paying for the consequences of that guarantee. Banking losses have fallen on them rather than creditors – hence extreme levels of austerity in the form of tax rises and government spending cuts.
The size of Cyprus's banking sector at an astonishing 800 per cent of GDP makes it much closer to Iceland than to Ireland. Cyprus could not have gone the Irish route even if it had wanted to. Its banking sector is too big to save. At "just" 400 per cent of GDP at the time the balloon went up, the Irish nation was in a better position to bankroll the losses. With Cyprus, as with Iceland, it's just not possible.
As proposed, bondholders are to be protected in the Cypriot bailout, consistent with the approach applied elsewhere in the eurozone. But even if they weren't, they are not big enough as a capital class to cover the losses. This has made applying a hair cut to depositors inevitable.
European rules, moreover, prevent the Cypriot government attempting to replicate Iceland (which is not in the EU) by protecting domestic retail depositors from a wider creditor haircut. Expropriation that discriminates between Cypriot depositors and other EU deposits is not allowed.
The obvious solution would therefore be to default on the Russian deposits, accounting for about a third of the total, or at least all deposits above the insured rate of €100,000. Unfortunately, this would be the end of Cyprus's banking industry, and the supposed economic benefits it brings to the island. A defaulting bank is a dead bank.
This none the less is essentially the choice facing the Cypriot authorities. To haircut insured deposits is political suicide, and as we have seen, profoundly destabilising for the eurozone as a whole. If it can happen in Cyprus, then it can happen elsewhere.
So why not just make the Russians bleed. If, as widely suspected, it's largely mobster money, would anyone care apart from the Russians themselves? And if the Russian government really does care, should it not be bailing out its own citizens, rather in the way the British and Dutch governments were forced to in the case of Icesave.
Admittedly, it would make Cypriot banks, and by extension the European Union, pariahs in Russian eyes. Germany in particular has made good diplomatic and trade relations with Russia a priority in recent years. These would be jeopardised. Cypriot's banking model would also be over, not to mention the backhanders liberally heaped on the higher echelons of Cypriot society. That particular gravy train would not be calling again.
But shocking to the traditional rules of banking though this solution might be, it is surely better than expropriating insured deposits, and/or, loading up taxpayers with decades of austerity. As Iceland demonstrates, small countries can and do get away with this sort of thing.
As for where the Russians then turn as a home for their dodgy money, well, there's always London…


The Яussians Are Coming! The Яussians Are Coming!

di Paul Krugman
da NYT

How big a deal is the Russian factor in Cyprus’s crisis? Pretty big, it seems. Over at FT Alphaville, Izabella Kaminska reports on estimates of 19 billion euros in Russian nationals’ deposits in Cyprus banks, which is more than the country’s GDP. Without being an expert here, I wonder whether this is an understatement; given what we think we know about the nature of much of this Russian money, is all of it really being declared as Russian?
Let me make a broader point: we’ve now seen three island nations around Europe become huge international banking hubs relative to their GDPs, then get into crisis because their domestic economies don’t have the resources to bail out those metastasized banking systems if something goes wrong. This strongly suggests, to me at least, that we have a fundamental problem with the whole architecture (to use the preferred fancy word) of international finance.
As long as you haven’t bought into the Barney-Frank-did-it school of thought, you realize that the global crisis of 2008 was in a fundamental sense made possible by the erosion of effective bank regulation. As Gary Gorton (pdf) has documented, we had a 70-year “quiet period” after the Great Depression in which advanced countries had very few major financial flare-ups; Gorton argues, and most of us agree, that the key to this quietness was a constrained, regulated financial system that also limited the opportunities for excessive non-bank leverage.
But this regulation in turn depended, to an important extent, on limited international capital flows; otherwise regulations made in Washington or elsewhere would have been bypassed via havens like, well, Cyprus. And once capital controls began to be lifted in the 1970s we entered an era of ever-bigger financial crises, starting in Latin America, then moving to Asia, and finally striking the whole world.
So what are we going to do about this? Cyprus, as a euro-zone country, should really be part of a euro-wide safety net buttressed by appropriate regulation; it’s insane to imagine that the euro can be run indefinitely with merely national deposit insurance. But euro-area deposit insurance doesn’t seem to be in the cards — and anyway, there are plenty of other potential Cypruses out there.
All of which raises the question, is the era of free capital movement just a bubble, fated to end one of these years, maybe soon?



Big trouble from little Cyprus

di Martin Wolf
da FT

camel, it is said, is a horse designed by a committee. This is unfair to camels, which are well-adapted to their harsh environment. The same, alas, cannot be said of eurozone rescue programmes. The proposed Cyprus intervention, rejected on Tuesday by the Nicosia parliament, will not help the eurozone make a smooth exit from its wave of crises. Indeed, the imbroglio should serve as a lesson in how not to deal with financial and sovereign debt problems.
Let us start with why some bank restructuring was inevitable. The government of Cyprus is both highly indebted and responsible for a banking sector that is surely too big to save. According to the IMF, gross government debt reached 87 per cent of gross domestic product last year and would reach 106 per cent of GDP by 2017, without the bailout. The sovereign credit rating is also far below investment grade: Standard & Poor’s rates Cyprus CCC+. That is not surprising: the banking sector still has assets over seven times GDP. (See charts.)

The banks stand on the edge of collapse. But it is theEuropean Central Bank that has pulled the plug by threatening not to accept Cypriot government debt as collateral against liquidity support. Banks have to be recapitalised. Taxpayers cannot do this, on their own. Without taxing depositors, the proposed rescue package would have had to be €17.2bn, instead of €10bn, or close to 70 per cent of GDP. This would have brought sovereign debt to some 160 per cent of GDP: an unsustainable burden. Indeed even the actual bailout package looks unsustainable, since it would appear to bring gross debt to 130 per cent of GDP. Under the programme, public debt is to fall to 100 per cent of GDP by 2020. Achieving that will demand substantial fiscal tightening and lending to Cyprus on easy terms. A restructuring of public debt is still likely. As Hamlet advises: If it be not now, yet it will come.
Is there no alternative to the bail-ins? Yes: direct bank recapitalisation by the eurozone, for which the sum required is a small matter. If the banking union had been up and running, that would have happened. It is not, presumably because core countries do not want to bail out mismanaged banking systems, such as theoffshore hideaway for Russian capital that is Cypriot banking. The banking union will not arrive before the cleaning up of past mistakes and establishment of new arrangements.
Turn then to whether what was done was right. The answer is: yes, though only up to a point.
Many insist that any tax on deposits is theft. This is nonsense. Banks are not vaults. They are thinly capitalised asset managers that make a promise – to return depositors’ money on demand and at par – that cannot always be kept without the assistance of a solvent state. Anybody who lends to banks has to understand that. It is inconceivable that banking – a risk-taking financial business – can operate without exposure to loss of at least some classes of lenders. Otherwise, bank debt is government debt. No private business can be allowed to gamble with taxpayers’ money in this way. That is evident.
The question, then, is not over the principle that lenders can face losses. It is about which of them should do so and to what extent. Apparently on the insistence of Nicos Anastasiades, the president of Cyprus, losses are to be imposed on deposits of less than €100,000, the upper limit for deposit insurance in the eurozone. The idea is to tax these smaller deposits at 6.75 per cent and the bigger ones at 9.9 per cent. That may now change – and for good reason. But forgoing the former would mean raising the rate for deposits above €100,000 to 15 per cent, to raise the required sum of €5.8bn. A good thing, I would argue. But the Russian government does not agree . Nor does that of Cyprus.
A big question is why ordinary Cypriot taxpayers should rescue banks at all? With no bailout and full protection of deposits under €100,000, the tax on the remainder (after allowing for €1.4bn from wiping out the junior creditors) would rise much further. Unjust? No. The only argument against this is that the government, as agent for taxpayers, created a dangerous financial system. So taxpayers must bear part of the cost.
Yet bail-ins create dangers. The actual package under discussion is a balancing act between those frightened of creating further panic and others determined to address “moral hazard”. The result may be the worst of both worlds. The fact that depositors are on the hook may trigger flight elsewhere. At the same time, taxpayers still bear a big part of the costs of failures.
This leads me to some big worries.
The first concern is the deal itself. The decision to impose losses on insured deposits is indeed a big error. (Yes, it is a default, not a tax.) But the decision to bail in some deposits was not an error. However unpopular it may be, a resolution regime that makes this a reality is necessary, in Cyprus and elsewhere. Another concern is the blanket coverage of the tax, which does not vary from bank to bank. This robs even big depositors of the incentive to monitor bank solvency.
The widest concern comes from the Banker’s New Clothes, the book by Anat Admati of Stanford and Martin Hellwig of the Max Planck Institute, which I reviewed earlier this week. Banks have so little loss-absorbing capacity that they stand permanently on the edge of disaster.
The case of Cyprus is an extreme example: beyond a small amount of equity stood only some €2.7bn in unsecured bonds (€2.5bn junior and €200m senior) protecting €68bn in deposits. Rightly or not, the other, including interbank loans were deemed untouchable. (See chart.) This structure gives the authorities not just in Cyprus, but virtually everywhere, a terrible dilemma: either rescue all institutions, thereby validating the riskiest business models and, at worst, putting the solvency of governments in danger; or refuse to rescue them and so risk causing a depression at home and panic abroad, particularly within the tightly integrated eurozone.
The eurozone must either make the industry far more robust, by hugely increasing equity capital, or consolidate fiscal capacity and tighten regulation, to ensure adequate eurozone-wide oversight and fiscal support. What is frightening is not that tiny Cyprus got into trouble, but that it is a source of wider danger. Banking is dangerous everywhere. But it still threatens the eurozone’s survival. This has to change – and very soon.

sabato 2 marzo 2013

Il disastroso bilancio dell'Austerity

Ormai il Financial Times è diventato il bastione del socialismo. O solo della ragionevolezza. Sia Wolf che Munchau, i due maggiori opinionisti economici, sono estremamente scettici sull'austerità, sulla UE, sul ruolo della Germania. Semplicemente hanno guardato ai risultati ottenuti, hanno fatto due conti e spiegato perché le cose non funzionano.


The sad record of fiscal austerity


di Martin Wolf
da Financial Times


At the Toronto summit of the Group of 20 leading economies in June 2010, high-income countries turned to fiscal austerity. The emerging sovereign debt crises in Greece, Ireland and Portugal were one of the reasons for this. Policy makers were terrified by the risk that their countries would turn into Greece. The G20 communiqué was specific: “Advanced economies have committed to fiscal plans that will at least halve deficits by 2013 and stabilise or reduce government debt-to-GDP ratios by 2016.” Was this both necessary and wise? No.
The eurozone was at the centre of the sovereign debt crisis frightening the world. Rapid fiscal tightening was judged essential for troubled governments. That view, in turn, persuaded those not yet subject to market pressure to tighten pre-emptively. That was very much the position of the UK’s coalition government. The idea that being Greece was around the corner gained traction in the US, too, notably among Republicans. Today’s battle over sequestration is partly a product of that concern.

A leading and, in my view, persuasive proponent of a contrary view is the Belgian economist, Paul de Grauwe, now at the LSE. He has argued that eurozone countries’ debt crises resulted from European Central Bank policy failures. Because of its refusal to act as lender of last resort to governments, they suffered liquidity risk – borrowing costs rose because buyers of bonds lacked confidence they would be able to resell easily at all times. That, not insolvency, was the immediate peril.
Today, argues Professor de Grauwe in a co-authored paper, the decision in principle of the ECB to buy up the debt of governments in trouble, through the so-called “outright monetary transactions” (OMT), allows one to test his hypothesis. He notes that the chief determinant of the reduction in spreads over German Bunds since the second quarter of 2012, when OMT was announced, was the initial spread (see charts). In brief, “the decline in the spreads was strongest in the countries where the fear factor had been the strongest”.
What role did the fundamentals play? After all, nobody doubts that some countries, notably Greece, had and have a dreadful fiscal position. One such fundamental is the change in the ratio of debt to gross domestic product. The paper makes three important observations. First, the ratio of debt to GDP increased in all countries even after the ECB announcement. Second, the change in this ratio turned out to be a poor predictor of declines in spreads. Finally, the spreads determined the austerity borne by countries. Paul Krugman of The New York Times adds an extra point: austerity was costly for the afflicted economies: the greater the tightening between 2009 and 2012, according to the International Monetary Fund, the bigger the fall in output (see charts).
By adopting OMT earlier, the ECB could have prevented the panic that drove the spreads that justified the austerity. It did not do so. Tens of millions of people are suffering unnecessary hardship. It is tragic.
Nevertheless, I can see two arguments for the ECB’s behaviour. The first is that help could only follow a demonstrated willingness to embrace austerity. Second, as the latest European Economic Advisory Group report rightly notes, the real problems have been destabilising capital flows, external imbalances and worsening competitiveness, not fiscal deficits. But one can justify fiscal austerity, brutal though it is, as the only way to force adjustments of relative costs and the needed labour market reforms. My colleague, Wolfgang Münchau, argues that the opposite is true. But I wonder whether the eurozone will survive its cure. Countries in the core would be better off themselves if they gave the weaker more time to adjust.
Countries outside the eurozone have been in a very different position. They had no need to fear the rising spreads of eurozone members because they did not face similar liquidity problems. To a first approximation, the yield on UK or US sovereign bonds should reflect expected future short-term rates of interest, with a small risk premium, since outright default is inconceivable. The widely held view that yields could soar is a bet on a surge in inflation. While inflation has been stickier than many expected, such a surge seems unlikely. Monetarists can note that the growth of broad measures of the money supply is low. Keynesians can note the excess savings of the private sector. Neither points to rising inflationary pressure.
Thus the panic that justified the UK coalition government’s turn to a long-term programme of austerity was a mistake. Had its members never heard of the paradox of thrift? If the domestic private and external sectors are retrenching, the public sector cannot expect to succeed in doing so, however hard it tries, unless it is willing to drive the economy into a far bigger slump. While short-term factors have played a real part, it is not surprising that the UK’s recovery has stalled and the deficit is so persistent. It is consequently also not surprising that downgrades are on the way, not that these tell one anything very useful in the case of an issuer with access to its own money-printing machine.
As Oxford university’s Simon Wren Lewis notes, “after the panic of 2010 was over, when it became clear that the debt crisis was really a eurozone crisis and UK long-term interest rates declined with the fortunes of the economy, we should have had a major change of policy”.
What would that change of policy consist of? The answer is simple. First, serious attention needs to be paid to why the UK non-financial corporate sector is running what seem to be structural financial surpluses, as Andrew Smithers of London-based economic advisers Smithers & Co points out. Second, the austerity on current spending needs to be made explicitly contingent on the economy: more when the economy grows faster and less when the economy grows more slowly. Third, every effort must be made to accelerate any structural reforms that might encourage higher investment by the private sector. Fourth, the banking sector must come clean on losses and accept needed recapitalisation so that it starts lending again. Finally, the government must recognise that current rates of interest provide a once in a lifetime opportunity for higher public investment.
In the long run, the fiscal deficit must close. In the short run, the UK has the chance to push growth. It should take it. So should the US.

fonte: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/73219452-7f49-11e2-89ed-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2M95IhJkS

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mercoledì 20 febbraio 2013

La crisi dell'Euro non è finita

Proponiamo di seguito un interessante disamina di Martin Wolf, capo economista al Financial Times. Wolf spiega con dovizia di particolari perché la crisi dell'Euro non sia finita. Si, il rischio spread è calato notevolmente, e questo potrebbe, ipoteticamente, dare più tempo ai nostri governi per rimettere a posto la UE. Ma per fare questo bisogna cambiare la natura dell'Europa e affrontare direttamente i problemi della crisi, il debito, la competitività e il disequilibrio tra Sud e Nord Europa. Altrimenti la crisi è destinata a tornare, e probabilmente prima di quando pensiamo.

Why the euro crisis is not yet over

di Martin Wolf
da Financial Times

Is the eurozone crisis over? The answer is: “yes and no”. Yes, risks of an immediate crisis are reduced. But no, the currency’s survival is not certain. So long as this is true, the possibility of renewed stress remains.
The best indicator of revived confidence is the decline in interest-rate spreads between sovereign bonds of vulnerable countries and German Bunds. Irish spreads, for example, were just 205 basis points on Monday, down from 1,125 points in July 2011. Portuguese spreads are 465 basis points, while even Greek spreads are 946 basis points, down from 4,680 points in March 2012. Italian and Spanish spreads have been brought to the relatively low levels of 278 and 362 basis points, respectively. (See
Behind this improvement lie three realities. The first is Germany’s desire to keep the eurozone intact. The second is the will of vulnerable countries to stick with the policies demanded by creditors. The third was the decision of the European Central Bank to announce bold initiatives – such as an enhanced longer-term refinancing operation for banks and outright monetary transactions for sovereigns – despite Bundesbank opposition. All this has given speculators a glorious run.
Yet that is not the end of the story. The currency union is supposed to be an irrevocable monetary marriage. Even if it is a bad marriage, the union may still survive longer than many thought because the costs of divorce are so high. But a bad romance is still fragile, however large the costs of breaking up. The eurozone is a bad marriage. Can it become a good one?
A good marriage is one spouses would re-enter even if they had the choice to start all over again. Surely, many members would refuse to do so today, for they find themselves inside a nightmare of misery and ill will. In the fourth quarter of last year, eurozone aggregate gross domestic product was still 3 per cent below its pre-crisis peak, while US GDP was 2.4 per cent above it. In the same period, Italian GDP was at levels last seen in 2000 and at 7.6 per cent below its pre-crisis peak. Spain’s GDP was 6.3 per cent below the pre-crisis peak, while its unemployment rate had reached 26 per cent. All the crisis-hit economies, save for Ireland’s, have been in decline for years. The Irish economy is essentially stagnant. Even Germany’s GDP was only 1.4 per cent above the pre-crisis peak, its export power weakened by the decline of its main trading partners.
If all members of the eurozone would rejoin happily today, they would be extreme masochists. It is debatable whether even Germany is really better off inside: yes, it has become a champion exporter and runs large external surpluses, but real wages and incomes have been repressed. Meanwhile, the political fabric frays in crisis-hit countries. Anger at home and friction abroad plague both creditors and debtors.
What, then, needs to happen to turn this bad marriage into a good one? The answer has two elements: manage a return to economic health as quickly as possible, and introduce reforms that make a repeat of the disaster improbable. The two are related: the more plausible longer-term health becomes, the quicker should be today’s recovery.
A return to economic health has three related components: write-offs of unpayable debt inherited from the past; rebalancing; and financing of today’s imbalances. In considering how far all this might work, I assume that the risk-sharing and fiscal transfers associated with typical federations are not going to happen in the eurozone. The eurozone will end up more integrated than before, but far less integrated than Australia, Canada or the US.
On debt write-offs, more will be necessary than what has happened for Greece. Moreover, the more the burden of adjustment is forced on to crisis-hit countries via falling prices and wages, the greater the real burden of debt and the bigger the required write-offs. Debt write-offs are likely to be needed both for sovereigns and banks. The resistance to recognising this is immensely strong. But it may be futile.
The journey towards adjustment and renewed growth is even more important. It is going to be hard and long. Suppose the Spanish and Italian economies started to grow at 1.5 per cent a year, which I doubt. It would still take until 2017 or 2018 before they returned to pre-crisis peaks: 10 lost years. Moreover, it is also unclear what would drive such growth. Potential supply does not of itself guarantee actual demand.
Fiscal policy is contractionary. Countries suffering from private sector debt overhangs, such as Spain, are unlikely to see a resurgence in lending, borrowing and spending in the private sector. External demand will be weak, largely because many members are adopting contractionary policies at the same time. Not least because it is far from clear that the competitiveness of crisis-hit countries has improved decisively, except in the case of Ireland, as Capital Economics explains in a recent
note. Indeed, evidence suggests that Italian external competitiveness is worsening, relative to Germany’s. Yes, the external account deficits have shrunk. But much of this is due to the recessions they have suffered.
Meanwhile, the financing from the ECB, though enough to prevent a sudden collapse into insolvency of weak sovereigns and the banks to which they are tied, required rapid fiscal tightening. The results have been dismal. In a recent letter to ministers, Olli Rehn, the European Commission’s vice-president in charge of economics and monetary affairs, condemned the International Monetary Fund’s recent doubts on fiscal multipliers as not “helpful”. This, I take it, is an indication of heightened sensitivities. Instead of listening to the advice of a wise marriage counsellor, the authorities have rejected it outright.
Those who believe the eurozone’s trials are now behind it must assume either an extraordinary economic turnround or a willingness of those trapped in deep recessions to soldier on, year after grim year. Neither assumption seems at all plausible. Moreover, prospects for desirable longer-term reforms – a banking union and enhanced risk sharing – look quite remote. Far more likely is a union founded on one-sided, contractionary adjustment. Will the parties live happily ever after or will this union continue to be characterised by irreconcilable differences? The answer seems evident, at least to me. If so, this unhappy story cannot yet be over.

fonte: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/74acaf5c-79f2-11e2-9dad-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2LNamElyG

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